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Using a unique dataset of corporate philanthropy, we find that direct giving activities are 
positively associated with higher levels and more influential, collaborative, and original 
innovation. In contrast, our results do not hold for corporate foundations’ contributions. Our 
results suggest that much of what is ostensibly promoted as philanthropy actually reflects 
research-related networking activities. The effect of direct giving on innovation is more 
pronounced in more opaque firms and more innovative and competitive industries. These 
findings provide evidence of the distinct motives by which firms choose between direct giving 
and foundation giving. Our study suggests that firms can use direct philanthropy to expand firm-
boundaries by developing innovation with research partners. 
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 “If, instead, corporations were to analyze their prospects for social responsibility 
using the same frameworks that guide their core business choices, they would 
discover that CSR (corporate social responsibility) can be much more than a cost, a 
constraint, or a charitable deed–it can be a source of opportunity, innovation, and 
competitive advantage.”                                                     – Porter and Kramer (2006) 
 
Corporate giving, either through corporate-sponsored foundations (foundation giving) or 
through direct giving, is significant. According to the Committee Encouraging Corporate 
Philanthropy (2011), the median firm in the Fortune 100 gave $53 million in 2010. The 
GivingUSA Foundation (2011) finds that approximately 69% of corporate giving in 2010 was 
through direct giving programs. Both the recipient identity and the amount of foundation giving 
must be disclosed through mandatory IRS filings, whereas neither is disclosed through any 
official filings for direct giving. Moreover, it has been reported that firms were opposed to 
disclosing their direct giving activities (Bryant, 1998), which appears surprising given the 
typically positive publicity associated with philanthropy. 
We argue that managers are hesitant to disclose their direct giving initiatives due to their 
desire to keep their strategies for corporate innovation proprietary.1  Technological innovation 
serves as an important dimension of firm-level competitive strategies and plays an increasingly 
influential role in the knowledge economy era (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; McGrath et al., 1996). 
However, firms engaging in innovative projects are often subject to various risks, such as high 
failure rates, imitative activities of competitors, and accelerated product life cycles (Bhattacharya 
and Ritter, 1983; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Hall and Lerner, 2010; Aggarwal and Hsu, 
2014; Chen, Chen, and Chu, 2014). This study thus aims to empirically examine if firms use 
corporate philanthropic programs to promote innovation.  
1 The Giving USA Foundation (2011) notes that of large gifts by corporations or corporate-sponsored foundations, 
32% of gifts went to higher education, 11% to other education organizations, and 11% to the health subsector, 
suggesting that a significant amount of corporate giving is associated with research partnerships. We present 
anecdotal evidence for the link between corporate philanthropy and innovation in the Appendix. 
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Regulators are aware of the large discrepancy in disclosure between corporate-sponsored 
foundations and direct giving, and have sought to improve the level of disclosure for charitable 
giving. In 1997, Representative Paul Gillmor and Senator Mike Oxley sought to require firms to 
disclose their charitable giving (this proposal was ultimately dropped). The comment letters were 
generally opposed to the legislation, often noting the role of giving in corporate strategy. As one 
example, the letter from Adolph Coors Company (1997) notes that, “in this specialized area, we 
believe the Gillmor requirements would have a devastating impact on these marketing and sales 
strategies, and the very worthy charitable endeavors they fund.”  
Philanthropic giving may affect innovation through two different mechanisms. The first, 
termed the “research networking” mechanism, posits that when firms establish connections with 
research organizations that expand the firms’ scope of knowledge and opportunity set to explore, 
the associated funds are sometimes officially referred to as “philanthropic.” Haley (1991), Smith 
(1994), Kahn (1997), and Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2010) all suggest that firms can use 
philanthropic programs to outsource research and development (R&D).2 In addition, developing 
R&D activities outside of firm-boundaries may lead to highly successful projects and also to 
many unsuccessful projects (Mata and Woerter, 2013), which subjects managers to a high level 
of private risk and motivates them to promote some activities that are actually external R&D 
investments as “corporate philanthropy.” Thus, managers have the incentive to innovate through 
an official corporate-giving program, likely entailing fewer organizational hurdles than 
proposing a new project. Lastly, non-profit research organizations could be wary of pursuing a 
2 Czarntizki and Hottenrott (2012) suggest that firms are able to utilize R&D collaborations to attenuate financing 
constraints. Chai and Shih (2013) examine public-private research partnerships; controlling for selection issues by 
examining firms just above and just below thresholds for funding cutoffs, they find very large increases in 
innovation for firms that receive government funding for their projects in collaboration with public research 
organizations. 
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project that directly and explicitly benefits a particular company but could more readily justify a 
project associated with philanthropic support (Porter and Kramer, 2002, 2006).3  
The second mechanism, which we term the “advertising mechanism,” helps firms 
facilitate innovation in the following ways: (1) researchers note that there is a consistently 
positive relation between firms’ CSR ratings (corporate philanthropy is generally associated with 
CSR ratings) and the employment-attractiveness of these firms as well as general efforts to 
improve firm-reputation4 – these workforce characteristics should benefit innovative firms to a 
greater extent; (2) corporate giving enables firms to improve their ability to interact positively 
with government regulators – a positive relationship with regulators is helpful for an innovation-
intensive firm that needs government support or subsidies for innovative activities; (3) corporate 
giving functions as a form of insurance from activists, and thus provides security to shareholders 
and managers (Baron, 2001; Godfrey, 2005; Cespa and Cestone, 2007), increasing the likelihood 
that innovative firms are able to exploit their inventions; and (4) philanthropy functions as a form 
of advertising, and leads to higher product prices.5 
Since both the research networking and advertising mechanisms suggest positive effects 
of corporate giving on innovation, we hypothesize that corporate charitable giving programs 
promote innovation. 
3 In one recent study of research organizations pursuing industry partnerships, D’Este and Perkmann (2011) provide 
a discussion of the reasons that academics engage with industry (and the relative importance of research-related 
motives and of commercialization). Additionally, Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2014) note the role of academics on 
firms’ board of directors, and how their presence is associated with higher levels of innovation. 
4 See Turban and Greening (1997), Albinger and Freeman (2000), Werbel and Wortman (2000), Backhaus, Stone, 
and Heiner (2002), and Peterson (2004).  
5 For advertising, see Schwartz (1968), Fry, Keim, and Meiners (1982), Navarro (1988), and Boatsman and Gupta 
(1996). For CSR leading to higher product prices, see Goett, Hudson, and Train (2000), Roe, Teisl, Levy, and 
Russell (2001), Loureiro and Hine (2002), Loureiro (2003), Loureiro and Lotade (2005), Eichholtz, Kok, and 
Quigley (2013); the ability to set higher prices would be especially relevant for newly innovative products. 
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Unlike the research networking mechanism, the advertising mechanism does not depend 
on direct giving per se, and can occur through either firms’ direct giving or their foundations. 
Different motivations and real effects between direct giving and foundation giving may lead to 
different innovation performance. We propose that the research networking mechanism mainly 
relies on direct giving and not foundation giving, due to the managerial flexibility, direct access, 
and lack of disclosure associated with direct giving. Moreover, we argue that firms are able to 
explore unique technology fields using research partnerships with non-profit organizations, given 
their own limited pool of expertise and human capital (e.g., Jaffe, 1989; Henderson, Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, 1998; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2002). Thus, these activities may lead to more 
original inventions that result from combining diverse technologies (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
Henderson, 1993; Fleming, Mingo, and Chen, 2007; Singh, 2008).  
In contrast to direct giving, foundation giving suffers from a number of limitations that 
prevent it from being used as a mechanism to support corporate innovation. First, foundations 
must disclose how much is given to each recipient on IRS form 990-PF. Second, foundation 
directors have a fiduciary duty to the foundation itself, rather than the sponsoring corporation 
(although the firm appoints the directors to the foundation and thus effectively controls the 
foundation’s board). Moreover, foundations have generally faced restrictions on “venture-
capital”-related activities. Lastly, direct giving is more efficient and effective than foundation 
giving in terms of forging research networks and collaborations because the latter channel 
requires more disclosure and involves more layers of administration. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that direct giving is more effective in promoting innovation than foundation giving 
because it drives more collaborative and original innovations.  
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 To examine the proposed hypotheses, we construct a dataset consisting of the financial, 
philanthropic, and innovation data of all U.S. public firms between 1989 and 2004. We combine 
our innovation data with a sample of direct giving and foundation giving beginning in 1989. Our 
sample separates direct giving from foundation giving and is composed of IRS disclosures for 
corporate-sponsored foundations and surveys for direct giving from Petrovits (2006), the Taft 
Group’s Corporate Giving Directory, the Chronicle of Philanthropy, the Foundation Center, and 
the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS).6 Our patent data is from the NBER patent 
dataset, and our financial data is from Compustat.  
We find that direct giving is significantly associated with more and better innovations, 
suggesting a positive relation between direct giving and the quantity and quality of innovation. 
We find that an increase in direct giving from the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth percentile is 
associated with a 17.2% increase in the quantity of patents, an 18.6% increase in patent citations, 
and a 3.5% increase in patent influence. Conversely, we do not find any significant relation 
between foundation giving and measures for innovation. 
The intriguing contrast between our results with direct giving compared to foundation 
giving suggests that the research networking mechanism, and not the advertising mechanism, 
spurs innovation and explains why firms have increased their direct giving much faster than their 
foundation giving in most recent decades. The advertising mechanism is not supported because 
innovation should otherwise also positively associate with foundation giving, as that would also 
help attract both high-quality human capital and pro-innovation customers, as well as provide 
insurance against governments and activists.   
6 For our sample of direct giving, The Chronicle of Philanthropy notes that some of the firms decline to respond due 
to company policy not to publicly release data that has not already been made public. We recognize the potential for 
selection issues in the disclosure of direct giving data, and report the results from Heckman selection models to 
mitigate this bias in Section II B.  
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We find a significantly positive relation between direct giving and both collaborative 
innovation and originality, suggesting that firms with more direct giving learn more from non-
profit organizations and have broader networks for innovation. An increase in direct giving from 
the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth percentile leads to a 38.3% increase in collaborative 
innovation and a 7.7% increase in originality. Conversely, we find no relation between 
foundation giving and these measures. We thus empirically justify the networking channel for 
the influence of corporate giving on innovation: Much of what is disclosed as direct giving 
enables firms to explore new technologies and expand their expertise by leveraging the 
capability of non-profit organizations. We further examine several supplementary tests and 
cross-sectional analyses. These analyses provide empirical support for a causal interpretation of 
our findings.  
Our paper contributes to the economics literature by providing empirical support for the 
economic value of corporate philanthropy, albeit from a new perspective. Corporate philanthropy 
is often regarded as wasteful due to agency problems (e.g., Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012).7 
As discussed earlier, some papers propose that corporate philanthropy serves the rational and 
strategic purpose of improving relations with governments and social activists, promoting brand-
awareness, and helping position a firm’s products. We propose a new explanation: Many 
activities officially disclosed as philanthropic appear to actually promote innovation by 
facilitating networking and collaborations with non-profit research-oriented organizations.  
7 Some researchers argue that corporate giving should not result in better operating performance, due to its 
associated agency problems and incentive issues (Friedman, 1970; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Jensen, 2002; Werbel and 
Carter, 2002; Brown, Helland, and Smith, 2006; Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 
2013; Masulis and Reza, 2014). However, Kim, Park, and Wier (2012) present evidence that CSR firms are less 
likely to take part in earnings management or GAAP violations (CSR is frequently associated with philanthropy); 
their evidence is consistent with managers of CSR firms behaving in a trustworthy and socially responsible manner. 
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Our use of patent data points to a new direction for the research on corporate 
philanthropy. Prior studies connect corporate giving to input variables including advertising 
expenditure (Navarro, 1988), capital investment (Graff Zivin and Small, 2005), and R&D (Lev, 
Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010) or output variables including return on assets, Tobin’s Q 
(Wang, Choi, and Li, 2008), and sales growth (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior study has examined the effect of corporate 
philanthropy on patent performance. The patent data have been commonly used in the economics 
and management literature because firm-level patent records contain detailed information about 
the contents, scopes, applications, and references of all registered inventions. Unlike R&D and 
capital expenditure, patent data enable us to construct various measures to capture firms’ 
innovation activities in different dimensions, such as patent influence, collaborative innovation, 
and patent originality. Moreover, patent-based measures provide information other than 
conventional financial ratios, enabling us to assess firm performance from a new perspective.    
Lastly, our study also adds to the literature on the strategies by which firms allocate 
financial resources to create innovation. In addition to in-house R&D efforts (which can also be 
affected by ownership and governance factors such as hedge fund ownership (Wang and Zhao, 
2014)), firms can acquire other firms with innovation (Sevilir and Tian, 2012; Phillips and 
Zhdanov, 2013; Bena and Li, 2014; Bernstein, 2014), or spur innovation by forming strategic 
alliances with specialized and innovative firms (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006; 
Robinson, 2008; Robinson and Stuart, 2007a, 2007b; Seru, 2014).8 Although previous studies 
8 There are other ways that firms are likely to foster innovation externally, as well. Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 
(1996), Stuart (2000), and Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006) discuss the alliances that firms might 
form, and the incomplete contracting issues arising in such arrangements. Establishing a subsidiary to focus on a 
particular project and allows innovative employees to share more profits is another approach, but it suffers from 
escalating costs of innovation (Gilson, 2010). Acquisitions are another potential strategy; however, they do not 
actually spur later innovations because the inventors at target firms become less productive after the acquisition, 
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have extensively examined the efficiency and efficacy of innovating through in-house R&D and 
M&A activities, whether and how firms promote innovation by providing financial resources to 
non-profit organizations remains under-examined, and the literature on the subject lacks 
empirical evidence. Since some non-profit organizations such as government-sponsored 
institutions, universities, and hospitals are known as incubators and harbingers of cutting-edge 
technologies that are valuable to the private sector (e.g., Nelson, 1986; Jaffe, 1989; Cockburn 
and Henderson, 1998), it is crucial for mangers to establish and maintain connections with these 
innovation hubs.  
 
I. DATA 
A. Data Sources and Empirical Measures  
Our data on corporate giving is from a number of sources. Petrovits (2006) provides us 
with her sample of both direct giving and foundation giving up to 2000. Her sample is derived 
from the Taft Group’s Corporate Giving Directory, which includes firms that give at least 
$200,000 annually to charities through either direct or foundation giving. This sample is limited 
to firms with at least three consecutive years of data that are also included on Compustat, and the 
data also includes the corporate foundation’s employer identification number (EIN). Through a 
request to The Foundation Center, we also collect the EINs of corporate-foundations created 
from 1999 to 2010. Using the EINs, we collect an updated sample of foundation outlays from the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which extracts data from each foundation’s 
possibly due to lower incentives and organizational burdens (Seru, 2014). Finally, we stress that the most 
fundamental, novel, and revolutionary innovations are typically from universities (Jaffe, 1989), which generally 
have both contracting and cultural reasons to prefer the type of collaboration that we suggest in our paper (Porter 
and Kramer, 2002, 2006). 
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990-PF filing. We also supplement Petrovits’s sample with a larger sample of direct giving data 
that begins in 1999 and ends in 2010 from The Chronicle of Philanthropy; it is the result of 
annual surveys completed by the top 300 firms in the Fortune 500.9 117 of these firms completed 
the most recent survey, and The Chronicle matches the foundation 990-PF data for an additional 
63 firms. Our sample can thus be treated as a combination of a large sample of firms’ direct 
giving and a complete sample of their foundation giving.  
The data we collect are reasonably representative. For example, our philanthropy data in 
the same year is approximately $2.4 billion given directly and $2.3 billion given through 
corporate-sponsored foundations in 2008. In the same year, the IRS reports approximately $11.6 
billion (about 1.2% of net income) in charitable contributions from approximately 835,000 firms 
(including foreign or non-public ones) filing a corporate income tax return in 2008. Given that 
we do not have the detailed information of all recipients, donation amounts, and final purposes of 
all giving, we assume that there is little variation in the use of philanthropic donations across 
sample firms. To mitigate the concern about inference biases due to firm-level variations in 
philanthropy, we conduct propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regressions, and 
Heckman selection regressions to address omitted variables and selection issues.   
We retrieve the patent records of these companies from the updated NBER patent dataset 
developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005a), which consists of detailed information such as 
patent inventors, patent assignees (i.e., firms), technology categories, the number of citations 
received by each patent until the end of 2006, filing dates and issue dates, and Compustat-
matched identifiers (CUSIP and GVKEY) of all patents approved by the U.S. Patent and 
9 We thank Noelle Barton at The Chronicle of Philanthropy for providing us with this data. 
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Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to 2006.10 These details help us to construct various 
innovation measures to reflect these firms’ innovation activities along multiple dimensions.  
We construct three common measures of firms’ innovation output. The first is “patent 
counts,” the number of successful patent applications filed by the focal firm in a sample year. 
This measure is a simple yet intuitive proxy for firm-level innovation from a quantitative 
perspective (e.g., Scherer, 1965; Griliches, 1981). The second is “patent citations,” (sometimes 
also referred to as “citation-weighted patent counts” in the literature). It is defined as the number 
of citations received by all successful patent applications filed by the focal firms in a sample 
year.11 The third is “patent influence,” defined as the log-linearized citations per patent, to reflect 
the influence (based on citations received) of the successful patent-applications for each firm-
year (Lerner, Sørensen, and Strömberg, 2011). These three measures have been widely used in 
the economics literature. Some researchers argue that patent citations better reflect the impact of 
a firm’s innovation and its associated economic values (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff, Narin, 
Scherer and Vopel, 1999; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005b; 
Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013). The patent citations 
measure that we use is the adjusted cumulative citations available from the NBER dataset, which 
corrects for the vintage bias due to the citation lag and excludes self-citations.  
Two additional issues about our innovation measures are worth noting. First, we scale 
patent counts, citations, collaborative innovation, and originality by the annual sales (in million 
dollars) of the focal firm. Sales reflect the scale of operational activities as well as the status of 
10 The original dataset developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005a) is at http://www.nber.org/patents/. An 
updated version is now available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads.  
11 Since old patents inherently receive more citations than new patents, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005a) estimate 
the citation-lag distribution (i.e., the fraction of lifetime citations) and then multiply raw patent citations with 
estimated future citations to obtain adjusted patent citations. 
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cash flows, and are regarded as an appropriate scaling factor for patents and R&D in the 
literature (e.g., Scherer, 1965; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). Second, we construct all innovation-
related variables by application year in order to precisely capture each firm’s innovation 
activities in each year (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005a). In doing so, we choose to drop 
innovation measures in 2005 and 2006 because the NBER database contains all patents granted 
by the end of 2006, and it takes an average of two to three years for a patent application to be 
subsequently approved since the 1990s (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005a and 2005b). 
The final step of our data construction is to collect financial and accounting data of 
selected firms from Compustat. Our main regressions use 615 firm-year observations over the 
1989-2004 period, consisting of 102 distinct firms with non-missing direct giving data, 
foundation giving data, and financial and accounting data for our main tests.  Nevertheless, in 
robustness analysis, we implement a Heckman selection model that allows us to make statistical 
inferences based on a larger yet less restrictive sample (almost 4,000 firm-year observations with 
non-missing direct giving or foundation giving), in which we obtain consistent evidence. Other 
studies set direct giving equal to zero if it is not disclosed. Doing so may not be appropriate for 
tests of this nature, since it could mix firms that do not disclose direct giving data with firms that 
do not give anything directly. Consequently, in our main tests, we choose to use sample firm-
year observations with non-missing direct giving data. 
B. Summary Statistics  
Table I provides the sample statistics of the variables that we study in this paper. Our 
summary statistics show that a significant amount of corporate philanthropy occurs through 
direct giving rather than foundation giving. For example, firms donate a mean (median) $19.2 
($10.8) million directly and $9.8 ($4.3) million through their foundations. The means of direct 
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and foundation giving correspond to 1% and 0.5% of firm sales, respectively; the medians of 
direct and foundation giving correspond to 0.5% and 0.3% of firm sales, respectively. An 
average firm with annual sales of $1 million dollars in our sample generates 0.012 patent counts 
and 0.173 patent citations. Our mean patent influence measure is 1.54, reflecting a mean of 9.2 
citations per patent. In addition, this typical firm with one million dollars in sales cites 0.005 
patents of non-profit organizations, and produces a score of 0.245 for originality. 
In Panel B, we show that direct giving and foundation giving (both scaled by sales) have 
a weak relation; the correlation coefficient between foundation giving and direct giving is 19%, 
suggesting that these two forms of philanthropy can be treated as distinct activities (although, 
admittedly, they may be affected by common factors). Additionally, whereas direct giving is 
significantly and positively associated with all of the innovation measures, foundation giving is 
only significantly and positively correlated with collaborative innovation (17%) that will be 
defined in Section IV. Our findings that the correlation coefficients between direct giving and 
innovation are less significant than those between foundation giving and innovation provide 
preliminary support for our hypotheses.  
 
II. RESULTS 
A. Direct Giving, Foundation Giving, and Innovation Output 
Panel A of Table II provides our main results from regressing patent counts and citations 
in year t+1 on direct giving in year t, typical control variables in year t, and year and industry 
fixed effects. Our control variables include R&D expenses scaled by sales (RD), advertising 
expenses scaled by sales (Advertising), market-to-book ratio (MarketToBook), debt-to-market 
12 
 
 
 
ratio (Leverage), logged sales (LogRevenue), and institutional ownership (InstiOwn).12 Patent 
counts, patent citations, direct giving, R&D expenses, and advertising expenses are all scaled by 
annual sales in the same year. Our statistical inferences are based on t-statistics of regression 
coefficients using standard errors clustered by firms that are robust to heteroskedasticity across 
firms and autocorrelation within firms. We show that direct giving is significantly and positively 
associated with larger quantities of patents in the subsequent year. Based on the coefficients, an 
increase in direct giving from the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth percentile is associated with a 
17.2% increase in patent counts, an 18.6% increase in patent citations, and a 3.5% increase in 
patent influence. These results support our first hypothesis that corporate charitable giving 
promotes innovation.13  
In Panel B, we examine whether foundation giving is associated with innovation from 
regressing patent counts and citations in year t+1 on foundation giving in year t, typical control 
variables in year t, and year and industry fixed effects. 14  Patent counts, patent citations, 
foundation giving, R&D expenses, and advertising expenses are all scaled by annual sales in the 
same year. To make the estimation results comparable to Panel A, we focus only on sample firms 
12 Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) and Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013) propose the effects 
of institutional ownership and corporate governance on innovation, respectively. Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru (2007) 
and Ciftci and Cready (2011) document that firms’ size and financing choice, respectively, affect their innovation 
performance. Year fixed effects are included to control for the effect of potential policy changes on innovation, such 
as bankruptcy codes, as discussed in Acharya and Subramanian (2009). Readers interested in more determinants of 
firm-level innovation are referred to a review article by Ederer and Manso (2011). In addition, the effect of direct 
giving on innovation is not eliminated by including the corporate governance index (G-index) of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). We do not include the G-index in our main regressions because the existence of the G-index reduces 
our sample-size. We do not include firm fixed effects because the existence of firm fixed effects may underestimate 
the effect of corporate giving on innovation. Since corporate giving is relatively stable across time and a firm’s 
innovation output could be highly correlated with its individual effect, any effect of corporate giving will be 
absorbed by firm fixed effects (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005b; Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi, 2007; Noel and 
Schankerman, 2013). 
13 The coefficients of R&D are insignificant in these regressions; this effect is driven by our focusing on firms in our 
direct giving sample. In fact, when we broaden our sample in the robustness check section, R&D loads as 
significantly positive, as expected. 
14 We conduct separate regressions for direct giving and foundation giving. Nevertheless, our results are reasonably 
robust to including both direct giving and foundation giving in the same regression.  
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that report direct giving to avoid selection issues in disclosure, although we obtain very similar 
results using a sample that includes all firms with foundation giving data. Consistent with our 
expectations, we do not find any evidence that foundation giving is associated with higher levels 
of innovation. Although firms have other reasons to engage in giving through foundations, the 
decision may not be primarily driven by desired innovation. Moreover, we discuss earlier that a 
number of issues – such as mandatory disclosure of foundations’ activities and restrictions on the 
type of investment that foundations can pursue – limit the ability of foundations to pursue 
innovation opportunities on behalf of their sponsoring firms.15 
The absence of a relation between foundation giving and innovation supports our second 
hypothesis that, compared to direct giving, foundation giving is not used as an effective tool in 
promoting innovation. This finding has a number of other implications. First, it helps explain 
why firms give less through their foundations compared to direct giving; foundation giving is not 
associated with increases in innovation. Our results suggest that to the extent that foundation 
giving could have an effect on innovation, we do not find any evidence of this relation. This is 
despite the view that foundation giving enables the firm to attract more highly-qualified 
employees and be partly protected from outside activists (i.e., the advertising mechanism). These 
benefits would enable it to more readily invest in innovation (Baron, 2001; Godfrey, 2005). 
Second, our results are not driven by some omitted variables – if both corporate giving and 
innovation are associated with improved future business prospects or sufficient financial 
resources, we would expect to see a relation with foundation giving as well. 
B. Endogeneity Issues and Robustness 
15 Geographic proximity to research organizations could also be a driver of giving. However, this hypothesis would 
predict a relation with foundation giving as well, assuming foundations are located close to their sponsoring firms. 
On the other hand, since our direct giving data consists of larger firms, and these firms tend to be more 
geographically dispersed, geography-based tests would be misspecified. 
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First, in Table III, we implement propensity score matching to construct a sample that 
contains direct giving firms and matched firms with similar characteristics including return on 
assets (ROA), cash holdings, and the Entrenchment Index from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009).16 Examining the effect of direct giving on innovation in such a sample mitigates the 
omitted variables because sample firms share similar profitability, cash balances, and 
governance. Given the smaller sample of firms with data for the Entrenchment Index, we first 
conduct the propensity score matching without the Entrenchment Index. As reported in Panel A, 
the characteristics of treated group are indifferent from those of matched firms with the 
exception of advertising expense, which is understandable given that these firms are generally 
more concerned with their reputation. This difference is not expected to affect our inferences 
because advertising expense does not promote innovation, as we report in Table II. Panel B 
shows regression results that direct giving remains positively and significantly associated with 
each of our five innovation measures, consistent with our baseline results. Similar results are 
provided in Panels C and D when we include the Entrenchment Index in matching. As a result, 
our baseline findings cannot be simply attributed to omitted variables related to profitability, 
cash, or corporate governance. 
Second, since measures of innovation output are persistent, we include lagged innovation 
measures and obtain consistent results in Table IV. In this table, we conduct Granger (1969) 
causality tests for whether direct giving causes higher levels of innovation output (patent counts 
and patent citations) – or whether those innovation measures Granger-cause direct giving. This 
16 In our propensity score matching tests, we match our direct-giving firm-years with industry peers that are not in 
our direct-giving sample, and control for corporate governance (institutional ownership and Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell’s (2009) Entrenchment Index), profitability (ROA), and cash balance. We also require the matched firm’s 
size to be in line with our direct-giving firm, to prevent confounding the results, and thus require revenue of the 
matched firm to be between 25% and 175% of the direct-giving firm. Our results are robust to omitting this 
constraint. If we cannot find an appropriate matched firm to a direct-giving firm, we drop that direct-giving firm. 
More details are provided in the table note of Table III. 
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set-up is empirically relevant because, if our earlier test results are driven by reverse causality, 
we would observe significantly positive coefficients on innovation predicting future levels of 
direct or foundation giving. We find that the direct giving coefficients remain positive, albeit 
with weaker statistical significance. In contrast, we do not find any evidence of innovation 
predicting direct giving. As a result, our finding is not subject to reverse causality issues. 
Third, we attempt to address endogeneity with two-stage least squares regressions. 
Motivated by Lev and Sougiannis (1996), we use the industry average of direct giving as an 
instrument for the firm’s level of direct giving. The intuition is that firms learned from their 
competitors in utilizing direct giving to establish research networks with non-profit 
organizations, or that firms are under competition for philanthropy due to its associated publicity. 
We provide the results in Table V. In the first-stage results, we show that industry giving is 
positively and significantly associated with the firm’s level of direct giving. In the second-stage 
results, we find that the coefficients of the instrumented direct giving remain statistically 
significant. In addition, these coefficients are larger than their counterparts in Table II, 
suggesting even greater economic importance for direct giving on innovation after addressing 
endogeneity.  
Lastly, given that firms voluntarily disclose their amount of direct giving to our sample 
database (although their philanthropic activities are not generally disclosed in regulatory filings), 
another issue to consider is whether restricting our sample to firms that disclose their level of 
direct giving introduces a sample-selection bias in our results. We address this issue with a 
Heckman (1979) two-stage sample-selection model using all firms with non-missing foundation 
or direct giving data (and set missing direct giving as zero). In the first stage, we model the 
probability of disclosing direct giving, with a probit specification. Specifically, we regress a 
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dummy variable that equals one if direct giving is non-missing and zero if direct giving is 
missing on all control variables (except R&D) and fixed effects we have considered in our 
baseline results shown in Table II Panel A.17 We then regress our innovation output measures 
that we use in Table II Panel A against the independent variables used in that table, as well as the 
inverse Mills ratio. Using the inverse Mills ratio controls for potentially endogenous sample-
selection issues. Table VI shows that our baseline results are robust to the selection issue – direct 
giving is significantly associated with innovation output measures. Moreover, the coefficients of 
direct giving are close to those reported in Table II Panel A. 
Our findings are also robust to additional tests. First, in Table A.I of the Internet 
Appendix, we control for direct giving and foundation giving in the same specifications. 
Comparing these results to Table II, we show that the results are little changed; direct giving 
remains positive and significant (and of similar magnitude), whereas foundation giving is 
insignificantly associated with innovation. 
Second, one concern with our results is whether we have controlled adequately for the lag 
between giving and innovation. Although Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) and Hall, 
Griliches, and Hausman (1986) present evidence that the lag between funding an innovation and 
filing for associated patents is typically less than one year, it is possible for giving-induced 
innovation to be associated with a longer time-period between initial funding and subsequent 
innovation. We conduct further tests using accumulated innovation measures in the subsequent 
three years (t+1 to t+3). As shown in Table A.II of the Internet Appendix, we find similar results 
17 We recognize that the validity of the Heckman selection model mainly depends on the specification of the 
selection equation. In principle, all variables that potentially affect selection should be considered. Although it is 
impossible to exhaust all potential determinants of direct giving, our best strategy is to include all control variables 
(except R&D) and fixed effects in the selection equation because they are all potentially relevant for explaining 
direct giving. In addition, we do not attempt to propose instrumental variables because it is not necessary to design 
instrumental variables in Heckman selection model for statistical inference (see Chapter 4 of Guo and Fraser, 2014).    
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with greater economic magnitude than the corresponding coefficients in Table II, suggesting that 
the influence of direct giving lasts longer than one year.   
Third, we examine the robustness of our analyses by expanding our sample to all firms 
that report either direct giving or foundation giving. We do so by setting to zero firm-years 
whose direct giving activities are missing from our proprietary sample. Doing so will generally 
weaken our main results (since a value of direct giving equal to zero may not be representative of 
the disclosed level of direct giving). In Table A.III of the Internet Appendix, we extend our main 
regressions to a sample of all firms with either non-zero direct giving or with corporate-
sponsored foundations. In this table, we show that direct giving remains generally significant. 
Also of interest is that, in our broader sample, R&D expenditure is significantly positive in all 
regressions, as expected. This indicates that sample-selection issues drove its earlier 
insignificance.  
We recognize that it is impossible for us to exclude all possible endogenous explanations, 
and we conduct further analyses in the following sections to further strengthen a causal 
interpretation of the effect of direct giving on innovation.  
 
III. EXPLORING THE MECHANISMS 
In this section, we examine how the effect of direct giving on innovation varies with 
industry- and firm-specific characteristics. Specifically, we inspect the effects of firm-level 
information asymmetries, industry-level innovativeness, and industry-level innovation 
competition on the direct giving-innovation relation. Firms with greater levels of information 
asymmetries are more likely to network with external parties, as these arrangements are less 
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visible. Innovation competition can also interact with the influence of direct giving on innovation 
by affecting the pressure to innovate and the incentive to network with external parties.  
Moreover, firms in high-tech industries require more innovation capabilities and are thus more 
motivated to pursue research networks with non-profit organizations. 
This section also helps strengthen the causal interpretation for the positive relation 
between direct giving and innovation output based on cross-sectional analyses. If both direct 
giving and innovation output were driven by an omitted variable, then the influence of this 
variable should be pronounced in all cross-sectional variation considered in this section. Since it 
is difficult to provide any potential factor that satisfies all these coincidences, a reasonable 
interpretation for our baseline results is that direct giving promotes innovation.  
A. Effect of Information Asymmetries  
We expect that firms with greater information asymmetries are also the kind of firms that 
would develop their innovations through the type of partnerships that can be less easily detected. 
Conversely, when a firm is more transparent to its investors and its competitors, it is more 
inclined to be the type of firm that is performing internal R&D. 
To test this proposition, we use analyst dispersion as a proxy for information 
asymmetries, following from Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998). Analyst dispersion is 
defined as the standard deviation of forecasts for earnings per share (EPS) made in the three 
months before the announcement of actual annual EPS divided by the mean of these forecasts.18 
Both the standard deviation and the mean are obtained from the unadjusted I/B/E/S summary 
data set.  
18 We also construct analyst dispersion based on 6-month-ahead forecasts and obtain similar results.   
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We first regress our innovation output measures (counts, cites, and influence) on the 
interaction term between direct giving and analyst dispersion, analyst dispersion, direct giving, 
and all other control variables used in prior tables. As shown in Table VII, the positive relation 
between direct giving and innovation appears to be stronger among firms with higher levels of 
analyst dispersion for counts and cites. We find that the coefficients of the interaction term are 
positive for innovation output measures, suggesting that opaque firms have greater flexibility in 
exploiting what is ostensibly “direct giving” to learn more and better ideas. The interaction term 
is insignificantly positive for innovative influence, although the coefficient of direct giving 
remains positive and significant. 
B. Effect of Innovation Competition  
Since one of the most important incentives for firms to innovate is to avoid default and 
bankruptcy resulting from weak product lines (Eisdorfer and Hsu, 2011), we expect industry 
structure to explain firms’ innovation choices. We suggest that the link between direct giving and 
innovation is more prominent in less concentrated industries for two reasons. First, firms in less 
innovation-concentrated industries face more severe technology-races, so most of their resources 
are used to ensure short-term survival rather than long-term profitability. These pressures 
encourage their giving activities to be focused on how these activities directly benefit the firm 
(as opposed to purely philanthropic giving). Second, fierce competition encourages firms to find 
diverse channels to develop unique innovations (e.g., Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1999). 
As a result, we would expect that greater innovation competition leads to more innovation per 
dollar spent on direct giving.  
To test this proposition, we first construct a Herfindahl index based on the ownership 
distribution of patents filed by firms in the same industry in the same year to measure innovation 
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concentration in each industry every year, 19  which is a reverse indicator of innovation 
competition. We then regress all innovation measures on the interaction between the 
concentration index and direct giving, the concentration index, direct giving, and all other control 
variables. As reported in Table VIII, the coefficients on the interaction term are significantly 
negative, supporting our proposition. The negative coefficient suggests that, in more innovation-
concentrated industries, firms generate fewer innovations per dollar of direct giving. This finding 
can be interpreted in two ways: firms in less competitive industries are more willing to commit 
direct giving to non-innovation purposes; or, market pressures encourage firms in more 
competitive industries to be more efficient in converting direct giving into innovation. 
Table VIII supports our proposition that the direct giving-innovation relation is stronger 
in more competitive industries since firms face stronger pressures to develop innovations, for 
counts and cites (similar to the results for Table VII, although patent influence remains 
significantly associated with direct giving, the interaction term is not significantly negative). Our 
finding further confirms the strategic use of direct giving, as we would not expect a moderating 
effect from innovation competition if direct giving were not made for innovation purposes. 
C. Industry innovativeness  
We also examine our baseline results by focusing on which industry-groups are driving 
the results by adding the interaction terms of direct giving and an indicator variable for each 
industry group to the regressions. The main presumption is that firms in high-tech industries 
require more innovation capabilities and are thus more motivated to pursue research networks 
with non-profit organizations. For presentational clarity, we do not display the additional 
explanatory variables that we use (RD, Advertising, MarketToBook, Leverage, LogRevenue, and 
19 For example, if there are three firms (A, B, and C) in industry j and they receive 0, 1, and 3 patents, respectively, 
in year t, industry j’s innovation concentration index in year t is 0.625 = [(0/4)2 + (1/4)2 + (3/4)2]. 
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InstiOwn) in Table IX. Among 12 Fama-French industry groups, we consider 10 non-financial 
and non-utility industries. We find that the effect of direct giving on our innovation output 
measures is largely driven by the business equipment (i.e., information technology) industry for 
patent counts and citations, and the health-care industry for all three of our innovation measures. 
Since the information technology and health-care industries are known to be innovation-
intensive sectors, the stronger direct giving-innovation relation in these two industries supports 
our proposition. 
 
IV. DIRECT GIVING, COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION, AND ORIGINALITY 
One reason that firms would innovate through collaborative partnerships is if their direct 
giving facilitates real options in their supporting organizations’ innovations, by enabling the 
firms to access different areas of expertise (Chesbrough, 2003). In this section, we study the 
networking channel by examining whether direct giving positively associates with two proxies 
that reflect the intensity and breadth of networking activities. The first variable, “collaborative 
innovation,” directly captures the extent to which a sample firm generates innovation by learning 
from non-profit organizations. A firm’s collaborative innovation in a sample year is defined as 
the number of citations that (1) are made by the patents filed by the firm in that year, and (2) cite 
prior patents owned by non-profit organizations with COD numbers from 6 to 15 (including 
universities, research institutions, governments, or hospitals).20 A higher value of collaborative 
20 Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996), Sorenson and Fleming (2004), 
and Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006) have used the citation flows to measure the knowledge diffusion 
due to geographic and social proximity and strategic alliances. In addition, the survey of Jaffe, Trajtenberg, Fogart 
(2000) provides direct evidence that citations reflect knowledge flows. In the NBER patent dataset, each approved 
patent is required to provide a list of citations of prior patents upon which it is developed, and this list is based on 
self-reporting or being requested by USPTO patent examiners. Using the citation data, we can closely track the path 
of knowledge flows. 
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innovation indicates a stronger collaborative relationship effect because the sample firms use 
more knowledge from their non-profit partners to develop their own inventions. 
The second variable, “originality,” measures the breadth of firms’ expertise and also 
reflects the magnitude of networking activities and associated benefits. The originality score of a 
patent is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the technology class distribution of all 
patents that have been cited by that patent (see Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe, 1997). If a 
patent has cited prior patents in a broader range, it is regarded as more “original” as it does not 
follow the trajectory of existing patents and combines more diverse technologies; thus, it 
receives a higher originality score (between zero and one). For a firm filing more than one patent 
in a sample year, its originality score is defined as the sum of each patent’s originality score. A 
higher value of originality indicates that a firm is able to create inventions based on knowledge 
from different resources; conditional on fixed financial resources and human capital, the firm 
that is able to use more different technologies is more likely to learn more from other 
organizations, such as non-profit research-oriented ones.   
In Panel A of Table X, we regress collaborative innovation and originality in year t+1 on 
direct giving in year t, typical control variables in year t, and year and industry fixed effects. 
Panel A shows a significant relation between direct giving and both collaborative innovation and 
originality. In Panel B of Table X, we consider three-year accumulated innovation measures and 
obtain consistent results. These findings suggest that firms can utilize direct giving programs to 
learn more from non-profit research institutes as reflected in greater collaborative innovation, 
and that such efforts result in innovation with higher originality, consistent with our second 
hypothesis. 
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The quantity of one-year collaborative innovation increases by 38.3% when direct giving 
increases from the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth percentile. This suggests that not only is 
direct giving associated with increased innovation as reported in Table II, but that the increase is 
most concentrated in the type of innovation where firms are likely to collaborate with outside 
research-oriented, non-profit partners.  
Similarly, we find that direct giving is positively associated with future originality of 
sample firms’ patent portfolios. In terms of economic magnitude, an increase in direct giving 
from the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth percentile leads an increase of 7.7% in originality in the 
next year. This estimate of economic significance further corroborates our argument that the 
positive effect of direct giving on subsequent innovation output can be attributed to the expanded 
scope of the focal firm’s innovative activities following direct giving.  
Conversely, panels C and D of Table X show no association between foundation giving 
and collaborative innovation or originality. This confirms our earlier findings that foundation 
giving is not associated with innovation output because foundation giving does not help firms 
gain access to non-profit organizations’ knowledge in developing new competitive advantages 
and expanding the range of creative activities.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper uses a unique dataset to examine the association between corporate 
philanthropy and innovation, and exploits the differences between direct giving and foundation 
giving. Our evidence consistently shows that direct giving – and not foundation giving – is 
associated with an increased number of patents and associated citations. Moreover, using patent-
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based innovation measures, we show the significant effect of direct giving on collaborative 
innovation and originality. This association supports our proposition that intangible investment 
activities developed in collaboration with outside research organizations are frequently disclosed 
as direct giving. In contrast, the insignificant relation between foundation giving and innovation 
suggests that corporate giving does not affect innovation through the advertising mechanism. 
The real effect of direct giving that we document is present in the industries for which we 
would most expect this association. It is also concentrated in firms with greater levels of 
information asymmetries and industries with more intense innovation competition, consistent 
with our proposition that using direct giving to promote innovation is subject to disclosure and 
competition pressure. Similarly, we show that direct giving affects innovation several years 
further into the future. Moreover, our propensity score matching, instrumental variable 
regressions, and Heckman selection tests suggest that our results are reasonably robust to 
endogeneity issues and voluntary disclosure issues.  
Our empirical investigation leads to a number of implications. First, our results suggest 
that what is generally referred to as “direct giving” actually reflects (at least in part) firms’ 
investments in certain high-risk research performed in collaboration with non-profit 
organizations. Second, our results indicate that different reasons exist for the decision to give 
through corporate-sponsored foundations compared to giving directly by the firm, and it is 
important for researchers to be aware of this difference when studying corporate philanthropy.  
Finally, our study provides new insights to understanding optimal boundaries of the firm. 
We show that certain kinds of projects – in particular, those outside of a firm’s traditional area of 
expertise – appear to be pursued through collaborations that involve direct corporate giving, 
rather than through internal research and development. Creating research networks provides an 
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alternative external mechanism to the market for corporate control for developing new 
innovations.  
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APPENDIX: ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF PHILANTHROPY AND INNOVATION 
We provide three motivating examples of research networks created through direct giving 
by Texas Instruments, Quest Diagnostics, and Hewlett-Packard that are consistent with our 
hypothesis. 
Texas Instruments (TI) is one of the firms that actively engage in generous philanthropy. 
In 2010, TI gave approximately $15 million through direct contributions and approximately $10 
million through its philanthropic foundation. Reviewing its foundation’s 990-PF filing for 2010 
shows significant outlays to societal causes such as various United Way affiliates (approximately 
$3.9 million), the Dallas Center for the Performing Arts Foundation ($2 million) and other 
cultural organizations (for example, $1.3 million to a matching gift program for education and 
arts). It is possible to identify each of the organizations that received grants from any firm’s 
foundation, and the amount received. 
Although we cannot identify every use of TI’s direct giving, we are able to examine some 
of its uses. One result of TI’s direct giving is the funding it provides for its Analog Design 
Contest. The contest has a first-place award of $10,000. TI features the program prominently in 
its corporate citizenship report, noting: 
“Our commitment covers campuses across the United States and around the globe. 
TI develops partnerships and programs to promote excellence in research, 
contributes financial resources, offers expertise and donates equipment – all with the 
specific goal to make higher education better and more accessible.” 
(http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/csr/factsheets/cthe.shtml) 
Clearly, a program such as this one enables TI to engage students in its products, and also to 
provide a mechanism in which students can innovate for TI because this contest enables TI to 
make use of the contest submissions for its future products. Its official contest rules state, among 
other items, 
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“Entrant hereby grants TI a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable and 
royalty-free license to use the Designs in, or as part of, TI products, to implement the 
Designs using TI products, to modify the Designs for such uses, and to publish the 
Designs for such uses by TI or by customers of TI under all applicable intellectual 
property rights related to the Designs, including but not limited to, patents, trade 
secrets, copyrights (including all moral and statutory copyrights), and trademarks. 
(http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/landing/universityprogram/rules.htm) 
Quest Diagnostics, a member of the Fortune 500 and the S&P 500, is the largest U.S. lab-
testing services provider. In 2014 it formed a partnership with the University of California, San 
Francisco (UCSF) to develop new diagnostic tools to identify genetic mutations and other 
biological markers that can be used to predict patients’ responses to various treatments.21 On the 
one hand, Quest Diagnostics gives UCSF researchers access to its exclusive patient database, 
which contains more than 1.5 billion patient encounters and is the largest private clinical 
database in the U.S.; in addition, the company also will provide grants ranging from $100,000 to 
$500,000 per project to UCSF researchers. On the other hand, the company is able to accelerate 
its transition into advanced diagnostics in the field of precision medicine by leveraging UCSF 
researchers’ expertise and capability in identifying biomarkers that may lead to new markets and 
profitable products.  
Hewlett-Packard (HP) is both a highly innovative firm and a firm that is engaged in a 
significant amount of corporate philanthropy. In 2009, HP gave $22.5 million directly and 
approximately $4.7 million through its corporate foundation. The donations from its foundation 
were largely for matching employee contributions (approximately $2.7 million) and other social 
causes (for example, approximately $800,000 to the American Red Cross and $300,000 to Save 
the Children). In contrast, its Global Citizenship Report shows a much clearer link with its 
business focus. As one example, its report notes its partnership with mPedigree to combat 
21 Sources: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702304347904579308702500522072 and 
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2014/01/111016/uc-san-francisco-and-quest-diagnostics-launch-collaboration-advance-
field  
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counterfeit pharmaceuticals through a unique authentication process. HP notes that its “patented 
anti-counterfeiting technology is the result of work we’ve done to develop and refine 
technologies in imaging and printing, cloud computing, and analytics.” Subsequent to the 
implementation of this program in Africa, HP announced in August 2011 that it had engaged in a 
partnership with the Indian pharmaceutical firm Themis Medicare to apply its technology to 
Themis Medicare’s products; this initiative, together with subsequent initiatives, suggests that 
HP’s ostensibly “socially responsible” activities in Africa were part of further developing its 
business strengths in pharmaceutical authentication. 
HP leadership has previously noted the role of innovation in its philanthropy. For 
example, in its 2008 Global Citizenship Report, then-CEO Mark Hurd discussed the ways in 
which its global citizenship activities strengthen its business. One of the ways mentioned by 
Hurd is innovation. Indeed, in noting customer emphasis on recycling and energy efficiency, he 
wrote that “responding to these growing market opportunities drives innovation within HP.” 
These three examples (TI, Quest, and HP) thus reflect some of the ways in which 
innovation-related investments could in fact be officially publicized and classified as 
“philanthropic.” 
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Table I: Sample Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A of this table provides the summary statistics for the variables of interest in our paper, and Panel B provides the Pearson correlation 
coefficients for these variables. The variables are: Direct giving (the disclosed level of direct giving by the firm), Foundation giving (the level of 
giving by corporate-sponsored foundations), DirectGiving (%) is direct giving scaled bye sales, FoundationGiving/Sales (%) is foundation giving 
scaled by sales, Counts (the number of patent applications in the subsequent year that are eventually approved, scaled by sales in million dollars), 
Cites (the number of non-self forward patent citations in the following year for patents that are subsequently approved, scaled by sales in million 
dollars), Influence (the logged ratio of Cites to Counts), CollabInnov (the number of patents filed in the following year that are subsequently 
approved citing patents that are owned by universities, research institutions, governments or hospitals, scaled by sales in million dollars), 
Originality is defined as the sum of one minus the Herfindahl index based on the technology class of all patents that have been cited by each 
patents filed by the firm, R&D (the Research & Development expenditure) scaled by sales in million dollars, Advertising (the advertising 
expenditure in that year) scaled by sales in million dollars, MarketToBook (the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets), 
Leverage (using the market value of the firm), LogRevenue (the log of sales), and InstiOwn (the percentage of institutional ownership. 
Originality is multiplied by 10. Our main sample includes 615 firm-year observations.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics  
 
 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
Direct giving ($Million)  19.2   3.0   10.8   24.6  24.2 
Foundation giving ($Million)  9.8   0.6   4.3   10.5  19.8 
DirectGiving (%) 1.003 0.216 0.539 1.073 1.677 
FoundationGiving (%) 0.532 0.045 0.341 0.700 0.897 
Counts 0.012 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.017 
Cites 0.173 0.001 0.030 0.168 0.375 
Influence 1.540 0.000 1.792 2.563 1.290 
CollabInnov 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.007 
Originality 0.245 0.000 0.241 0.394 0.213 
R&D 0.042 0.000 0.028 0.063 0.048 
Advertising 0.027 0.000 0.011 0.042 0.039 
MarketToBook 2.315 1.291 1.772 2.770 1.619 
Leverage 0.224 0.063 0.169 0.318 0.204 
LogRevenue 9.615 9.293 9.810 10.389 1.009 
InstiOwn(%) 49.0% 43.1% 54.6% 65.1% 24.7% 
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Panel B: Correlations 
 
 Counts Cites Influence 
Collab 
Innov 
Origin-
ality 
Direct 
Giving 
/Rev 
Found 
Giving 
/Rev 
R&D 
/Rev 
Advert-
ising/Rev 
Market 
ToBook 
Leve-
rage 
Log 
Rev 
Insti 
Own 
Counts 1 
            Cites 0.802*** 1 
           Influence 0.366*** 0.469*** 1 
          CollabInnov 0.610*** 0.328*** 0.210*** 1 
         Originality 0.817*** 0.553*** 0.163*** 0.535*** 1 
        DirectGiving/Rev 0.347*** 0.246*** 0.166*** 0.510*** 0.179*** 1 
       FoundationGiving/Rev 0.0791 0.0242 0.0778 0.173*** 0.0516 0.194*** 1 
      R&D/Rev 0.405*** 0.259*** 0.110* 0.411*** 0.350*** 0.559*** 0.212*** 1 
     Advertising/Rev 0.034 -0.0349 -0.0236 -0.086 -0.0201 0.0792 0.0957* 0.224*** 1 
    MarketToBook 0.0989* -0.029 -0.0804 0.179*** 0.0863 0.410*** 0.249*** 0.501*** 0.406*** 1 
   Leverage -0.203*** -0.175*** -0.00505 -0.129** -0.188*** -0.273*** -0.150** -0.363*** -0.310*** -0.578*** 1 
  LogRevenue -0.241*** -0.235*** -0.216*** -0.222*** -0.133** -0.151*** -0.192*** -0.0943* -0.0376 0.0185 0.177*** 1 
 InstiOwn 0.0950* 0.0676 -0.156*** 0.118** 0.127** 0.113* 0.0146 0.00308 0.0222 -0.00798 -0.066 -0.158 1 
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Table II: Effects of Corporate Philanthropy on Innovation Output 
 
This table examines the effects of direct giving and foundation giving on innovation. The dependent variables are: Counts (the number of patent 
applications in the subsequent year that are eventually approved, scaled by sales), Cites (the number of non-self forward patent citations in the 
following year for patents that are subsequently approved, scaled by sales), and Influence (the logged ratio of Cites to Counts). The independent 
variables are: DirectGiving (the disclosed level of direct giving by the firm scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), FoundationGiving (the level 
of giving by corporate sponsored foundations scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), RD (Research & Development expenditure scaled by 
sales), Advertising (advertising expenditure scaled by sales), MarketToBook (the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets), 
Leverage (using the market value of the firm), LogRevenue (the log of sales), and InstiOwn (the percentage of institutional ownership). We 
include year and Fama-French 48 (FF48) industry fixed-effects. All sample firms are required to have non-zero direct giving. Panel A studies the 
effects of direct giving and Panel B studies the effects of giving by corporate-sponsored foundations. T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered 
standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Direct giving Panel B: Foundation giving 
 
Counts Cites Influence Counts Cites Influence 
          
  DirectGiving 0.002*** 0.032*** 0.061***   
  
 
(3.747) (3.528) (3.014)   
  FoundationGiving    -0.000 0.002 0.014 
 
   (-0.365) (0.096) (0.321) 
RD 0.041 -0.191 -1.272 0.078 0.334 -0.341 
 
(0.888) (-0.201) (-0.615) (1.627) (0.336) (-0.160) 
Advertising -0.030 -1.006* -0.049 -0.055 -1.392** -0.784 
 
(-0.931) (-1.849) (-0.034) (-1.630) (-2.272) (-0.458) 
MarketToBook -0.001 -0.034** -0.012 -0.000 -0.029* -0.002 
 
(-0.703) (-2.065) (-0.262) (-0.205) (-1.766) (-0.050) 
Leverage -0.006 -0.236* -0.023 -0.004 -0.205* 0.038 
 
(-0.983) (-1.921) (-0.081) (-0.650) (-1.664) (0.137) 
LogRevenue -0.002 -0.047 0.243* -0.003 -0.057 0.227* 
 
(-0.752) (-0.742) (1.969) (-1.111) (-0.892) (1.805) 
InstiOwn 0.005 0.194* 0.098 0.007 0.214** 0.136 
 
(1.095) (1.917) (0.417) (1.377) (2.128) (0.553) 
Constant 0.031 0.811 0.179 0.038 0.892 0.293 
 
(1.350) (1.245) (0.145) (1.648) (1.359) (0.235) 
    
  
  Observations 615 615 615 615 615 615 
R-square 61.0% 55.1% 71.3% 58.7% 54.0% 70.9% 
    
  
  
    
  
  Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table III: Propensity Score Matching  
 
In this table, we provide results for a propensity score matched sample: We estimate the propensity to be a direct-giving firm given various firm 
characteristics with a logit model, regressing an indicator variable for firm-years with nonzero direct giving against the following variables (as 
defined in Table II): RD, Advertising, MarketToBook, Leverage, LogRevenue, and InstiOwn, as well as Cash (cash balance, scaled by assets) 
and ROA (earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by assets). For our results in Panels C and D, we also include the variable E-Index, defined as 
the Entrenchment Index from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), backfilled for years where it is not available. We then rank the estimated 
propensity score and match each direct giving firm to a non-direct giving sample firm in the same industry with the closest propensity score. We 
omit observations where the matched firm has revenue less than 25% or greater than 175% of the giving firm’s value. In Panels A and C, we 
provide results for t-tests on the control variables for direct giving firms and non-direct giving firms matched based on propensity score matching. 
In Panels B and D, we estimate the following regression model by using direct-giving firms and matched non-direct giving firms: 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡+1 =
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 × 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, where 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 is the Fama-French 48 industry fixed effect; 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of 
control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent influence, collaborative innovation, 
and patent originality measured at t+1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, 
and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: T-tests on matched sample 
  
Matched 
control 
firms 
Direct 
giving 
firms P-value 
RD 0.033 0.030 0.382 
Advertising 0.010 0.018 0.000 
MarketToBook 2.081 2.047 0.770 
Leverage 0.238 0.246 0.590 
LogRevenue 9.387 9.284 0.215 
InstiOwn 51.4% 49.2% 0.293 
Cash 0.064 0.063 0.926 
ROA 0.121 0.118 0.591 
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Panel B: Regressions on matched sample 
  Counts Cites Influence Collab Innov Originality 
DirectGiving 0.003*** 0.048*** 0.090*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 
(6.968) (5.471) (3.330) (5.409) (3.484) 
RD 0.060 0.079 -0.811 0.061* 0.412** 
 
(1.162) (0.058) (-0.301) (1.725) (2.551) 
Advertising -0.010 0.008 -0.085 -0.016 -0.005 
 
(-0.628) (0.016) (-0.051) (-1.595) (-0.077) 
MarketToBook 0.000 -0.033* -0.012 0.001* 0.001 
 
(0.096) (-1.789) (-0.295) (1.691) (0.520) 
Leverage -0.007 -0.292** -0.008 -0.001 -0.013 
 
(-1.421) (-2.335) (-0.027) (-0.300) (-0.690) 
LogRevenue -0.001 -0.007 0.239*** -0.000 -0.002 
 
(-0.568) (-0.287) (3.503) (-0.077) (-0.857) 
InstiOwn 0.002 0.067 -0.210 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.804) (1.172) (-1.140) (0.159) (-0.082) 
Constant 0.019* 0.398 -0.022 0.002 0.043 
 
(1.734) (1.310) (-0.033) (0.382) (1.432) 
      Observations 684 684 684 684 684 
R-square 61.2% 53.7% 63.2% 53.5% 60.2% 
      
      Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
41 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: T-tests on matched sample 
  
Matched control 
firms 
Direct giving 
firms P-value 
RD 0.032 0.028 0.224 
Advertising 0.011 0.016 0.027 
MarketToBook 2.145 2.062 0.520 
Leverage 0.238 0.237 0.927 
LogRevenue 9.287 2.207 0.374 
InstiOwn 56.5% 55.8% 0.689 
Cash 0.062 0.063 0.868 
ROA 0.118 0.123 0.432 
E-index 2.040 2.140 0.278 
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Panel D: Regressions on matched sample 
  Counts Cites Influence Collab Innov Originality 
DirectGiving 0.002*** 0.043*** 0.086*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 
 
(7.480) (5.397) (2.779) (5.555) (3.550) 
RD 0.124*** 1.136 0.624 0.094*** 0.532*** 
 
(2.834) (1.012) (0.317) (2.742) (3.263) 
Advertising -0.008 -0.180 -0.884 -0.010 0.008 
 
(-0.391) (-0.349) (-0.407) (-0.923) (0.079) 
MarketToBook -0.000 -0.035** -0.048 0.001** 0.000 
 
(-0.477) (-2.153) (-1.457) (2.059) (0.182) 
Leverage -0.009* -0.332*** -0.102 -0.002 -0.023 
 
(-1.808) (-2.628) (-0.358) (-0.788) (-1.038) 
LogRevenue -0.001 -0.018 0.150* -0.000 -0.002 
 
(-0.511) (-0.592) (1.891) (-0.227) (-0.654) 
InstiOwn 0.003 0.153 -0.172 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.729) (1.471) (-0.738) (-0.956) (-0.195) 
E-index -0.000 -0.025* -0.006 0.001** 0.001 
 
(-0.718) (-1.849) (-0.116) (2.121) (0.380) 
Constant 0.016 0.524 1.701** -0.001 0.033 
 
(1.448) (1.506) (2.372) (-0.251) (1.035) 
      Observations 598 598 598 598 598 
R-square 61.3% 55.7% 59.8% 55.9% 55.7% 
      
      Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table IV: Direct Giving and Innovation – Granger Causality Tests 
 
This table provides Granger causality tests for the results in Table II; all dependent variables and independent variables are as defined in Table II, 
and we include year and Fama-French 48 fixed-effects. All sample firms are required to have non-zero direct giving. T-statistics based on robust 
firm-clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
  Countst+1 DirectGivingt+1 Citest+1 DirectGivingt+1 Influencet+1 DirectGivingt+1 
  
  
 
  
  DirectGivingt 0.809*** 0.2901*** 4.297 0.2847*** 30.555** 0.2855*** 
 
(2.779) (2.683) (1.063) (2.646) (2.523) (2.650) 
Countst 0.843*** -0.0006 
 
  
  
 
(19.360) (-0.216) 
 
  
  Citest 
 
  0.855*** 0.0001 
  
  
  (24.116) (0.721) 
  Influencet 
 
  
 
  0.540*** 0.0001 
  
  
 
  (5.534) (1.018) 
RDt -0.008 0.0021 0.030 0.0021 -0.263 0.0022 
 
(-0.921) (1.057) (0.146) (1.063) (-0.256) (1.149) 
Advertisingt -0.010 -0.0010 -0.236 -0.0008 0.248 -0.0009 
 
(-1.267) (-0.398) (-1.266) (-0.355) (0.346) (-0.370) 
MarketToBookt -0.000** -0.0000 -0.017*** -0.0000 -0.027 -0.0000 
 
(-2.032) (-0.842) (-2.824) (-0.773) (-1.246) (-0.859) 
Leveraget 0.000 -0.0005** -0.021 -0.0005** 0.048 -0.0005** 
 
(0.233) (-2.558) (-0.622) (-2.598) (0.249) (-2.565) 
LogRevenuet -0.000 0.0001 -0.008 0.0001 0.042 0.0001 
 
(-0.135) (1.357) (-0.774) (1.406) (0.677) (1.229) 
IntiOwnt -0.000 0.0002 0.009 0.0002 0.017 0.0002 
 
(-0.019) (1.480) (0.282) (1.309) (0.159) (1.446) 
Constant 0.003 -0.0008 0.102 -0.0009 0.436 -0.0008 
 
(0.542) (-0.930) (0.842) (-1.031) (0.691) (-0.912) 
  
  
 
  
  Observations 588 588 588 588 588 588 
R-squared 90.4% 63.4% 91.2% 63.6% 81.4% 63.6% 
  
  
 
  
  Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table V: Direct Giving and Innovation – Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions 
 
This table provides two-stage least squares regression results, where the instrument is the mean direct giving of the firm’s Fama-French 12 
industry group (IndustryGiving). All other variables are defined as in Table II. We include year and Fama-French 48 industry fixed-effects. T-
statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant 
differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
First-stage Second-stage 
 
Direct 
Giving Counts Cites Influence 
          
DirectGiving   0.004** 0.108* 0.048 
 
  (2.512) (1.817) (0.718) 
RD 17.427*** 0.009 -1.452 -1.050 
 
(2.941) (0.192) (-1.089) (-0.451) 
Advertising -10.224 -0.007 -0.095 -0.209 
 
(-1.532) (-0.185) (-0.119) (-0.122) 
MarketToBook 0.086 -0.001 -0.048** -0.009 
 
(1.198) (-1.020) (-2.093) (-0.204) 
Leverage 0.543 -0.008 -0.311* -0.010 
 
(0.986) (-1.236) (-1.945) (-0.034) 
LogRevenue -0.321 -0.001 -0.022 0.238* 
 
(1.607) (-0.490) (-0.406) (1.909) 
InstiOwn 0.602 0.004 0.146 0.106 
 
(1.465) (0.874) (1.532) (0.452) 
IndustryGiving 0.842**    
 
(2.600)    
Constant 1.815 0.016 0.353 -2.590* 
 
(0.998) (0.691) (0.560) (-1.944) 
 
  
   Observations 615 615 615 615 
R-square 51.0% 59.0% 48.9% 71.3% 
 
  
   
 
  
   Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
   Underidentification test: 
   Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 5.29 
   P-value 0.0215 
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Table VI: Heckman Specification 
 
This table examines the effects of direct giving on innovation with a Heckman two-step specification. All variables are defined as in Table II. We 
include year and Fama-French 48 industry fixed-effects. In the first stage (selection equation), we regress a dummy variable that equals one if 
direct giving is non-missing and zero if direct giving is missing on all control variables (except R&D) and the fixed effects considered in our 
baseline results shown in Table II Panel A. In the second stage, we regress innovation measures on direct giving, the inverse Mills ratio, and all 
other control variables used in Table II Panel A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient 
value. Our regression sample includes all year observations of firms that have ever reported direct giving or foundation giving. *, **, and *** 
denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Counts Cites Influence 
        
DirectGiving 0.002*** 0.030*** 0.058** 
 
(5.135) (3.728) (2.570) 
RD 0.038* -0.234 -1.354 
 
(1.736) (-0.528) (-1.139) 
Advertising -0.130*** -2.442*** -2.764 
 
(-3.034) (-2.908) (-1.249) 
MarketToBook -0.000 -0.030*** -0.004 
 
(-0.490) (-2.648) (-0.132) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.163 0.116 
 
(-0.165) (-1.645) (0.437) 
LogRevenue -0.013*** -0.212*** -0.070 
 
(-3.300) (-2.617) (-0.321) 
InstiOwn 0.007** 0.221*** 0.148 
 
(2.500) (3.901) (0.993) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.018*** -0.263** -0.496 
 
(-3.084) (-2.147) (-1.502) 
Constant 0.147*** 2.334*** 0.792 
 
(3.319) (2.618) (0.332) 
    Observations (first-stage) 3,962 3,962 3,962 
Observations (second-stage) 615 615 615 
Pseudo R-square 36.4% 43.2% 66.7% 
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Table VII: Direct Giving and Innovation – Conditional on Information Asymmetries 
 
This table examines the effects of information asymmetries on the relation between direct giving and innovation. We measure information 
asymmetries using analyst dispersion, which is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) 
made in three months before the announcement of actual annual EPS. All other variables are defined as in Table II. We include year and Fama-
French 48 industry fixed-effects. All sample firms are required to have non-zero direct giving. T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard 
errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
 
Counts Cites Influence 
        
DirectGiving 0.002*** 0.023** 0.051** 
 
(2.929) (2.584) (2.505) 
Disp_Med_3 -0.005 -0.055 0.060 
 
(-1.289) (-0.623) (0.140) 
DirectGiving 0.018*** 0.433*** 0.041 
 x Disp_Med_3 (3.448) (3.083) (0.097) 
RD 0.051 -0.069 -1.219 
 
(1.093) (-0.074) (-0.656) 
Advertising -0.032 -1.070** -0.675 
 
(-0.997) (-2.067) (-0.485) 
MarketToBook -0.001 -0.034** -0.002 
 
(-0.783) (-2.054) (-0.047) 
Leverage -0.007 -0.269* 0.090 
 
(-1.182) (-1.957) (0.297) 
LogRevenue -0.002 -0.049 0.241* 
 
(-0.842) (-0.728) (1.941) 
InstiOwn 0.006 0.194* 0.091 
 
(1.076) (1.810) (0.378) 
Constant 0.025 0.565 -2.655* 
 
(0.941) (0.752) (-1.928) 
    Observations 602 602 602 
R-square 62.1% 56.2% 72.6% 
    
    Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table VIII: Direct Giving and Innovation – Conditional on Innovation Competition 
 
This table examines the effects of innovation concentration on the relation between direct giving and innovation. Innovation concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl Index based on the distribution of patents filed by all firms in the same industry in the same year, and is a reverse 
indicator of innovation competition. All other variables are defined as in Table II. We include year and Fama-French 48 industry fixed-effects. 
All sample firms are required to have non-zero direct giving. T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard errors are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Counts Cites Influence 
        
DirectGiving 0.003*** 0.035*** 0.102** 
 
(7.860) (3.657) (2.259) 
Herfindahl 0.001 0.054 0.229 
 
(0.319) (0.423) (0.769) 
DirectGiving -0.003*** -0.064*** -0.158 
 x Herfindahl (-2.913) (-3.103) (-1.662) 
RD 0.076** 0.846 -0.360 
 
(2.079) (0.933) (-0.143) 
Advertising -0.002 -1.517** -0.764 
 
(-0.079) (-2.143) (-0.505) 
MarketToBook -0.001 -0.028 -0.056 
 
(-1.068) (-1.250) (-0.957) 
Leverage -0.019** -0.434** -0.188 
 
(-2.245) (-2.401) (-0.497) 
LogRevenue -0.004 -0.143 0.119 
 
(-1.258) (-1.364) (0.705) 
InstiOwn -0.002 0.140 0.028 
 
(-0.369) (1.038) (0.100) 
Constant 0.048 1.470 -1.112 
 
(1.398) (1.320) (-0.678) 
    Observations 384 384 384 
R-square 69.6% 61.3% 70.6% 
    
    Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table IX: Effects of Industry Interaction Terms  
 
This table examines the effects of direct giving on innovation with a focus on which industries the effects are most prevalent. All variables and 
regression specifications are defined as in Table II. Fama-French 12 industry groups (excluding financials and utilities) are used for the 
interaction terms. We include year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed-effects. The following explanatory variables are used in this table’s 
regressions, but are not displayed for conciseness: RD, Advertising, MarketToBook, Leverage, LogRevenue, and InstiOwn. All sample firms are 
required to have non-zero direct giving. T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Counts Cites Influence 
        
DirectGiving × ConsumerNonDurables 0.001 0.052 0.258 
 
(0.343) (0.661) (0.772) 
DirectGiving × ConsumerDurables -0.044 -0.274 1.533 
 
(-1.013) (-0.526) (1.335) 
DirectGiving × Manufacturing 0.007 0.021 -0.143 
 
(0.619) (0.165) (-0.725) 
DirectGiving × OilGasCoal -0.000 -0.098 0.830 
 
(-0.005) (-1.223) (1.402) 
DirectGiving × Chemicals -0.003 0.023 -0.371 
 
(-0.493) (0.316) (-1.178) 
DirectGiving × BusEquipment 0.007*** 0.190*** 0.106 
 
(3.296) (3.909) (1.440) 
DirectGiving × Phone -0.001 -0.069 -0.085 
 
(-0.418) (-0.869) (-0.471) 
DirectGiving × WholesaleRetail -0.004 -0.086 -0.421 
 
(-1.151) (-1.227) (-1.243) 
DirectGiving × HealthcareMedEqDrugs 0.003*** 0.044*** 0.079*** 
 
(6.847) (5.598) (4.068) 
DirectGiving × Other -0.001 -0.009 -0.022 
 
(-1.293) (-0.622) (-0.504) 
Constant 0.017 0.384 -0.583 
 
(1.038) (1.030) (-0.810) 
    Observations 615 615 615 
R-squared 54.1% 50.8% 70.0% 
    Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FF12 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table X: Effects of Corporate Philanthropy on Collaborative Innovation and Originality 
 
This table examines the effects of direct giving and foundation giving on innovation. The dependent variables are CollabInnov (the number of 
patents filed that are subsequently approved and cite patents owned by universities, research institutions, governments or hospitals, scaled by 
sales) and Originality based on the distribution of cited patents’ technology class. Originality is multiplied by 10. The independent variables are: 
DirectGiving (the disclosed level of direct giving by the firm scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), FoundationGiving (the level of giving by 
corporate sponsored foundations scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), RD (Research & Development expenditure scaled by sales), 
Advertising (advertising expenditure scaled by sales), MarketToBook (the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets), Leverage 
(using the market value of the firm), LogRevenue (the log of sales), and InstiOwn (the percentage of institutional ownership. We include year and 
Fama-French 48 industry fixed-effects. All sample firms are required to have non-zero direct giving. Panels A and B study the effects of direct 
giving and Panels C and D study the effects of giving by corporate-sponsored foundations. The dependent variables in Panels A and C (B and D) 
are for collaborative innovation and originality in the following year (following three years). T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard 
errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Following year's innovation 
Panel B: Cumulative three-year 
innovation 
 
CollabInnov Originality CollabInnov[t+1,t+3] Originality[t+1,t+3] 
        
 DirectGiving 0.002*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.014** 
 
(2.778) (1.999) (2.901) (2.570) 
RD 0.016 0.282* 0.035 0.595 
 
(1.066) (1.858) (0.747) (1.267) 
Advertising -0.027 -0.051 -0.116* -0.213 
 
(-1.654) (-0.506) (-1.697) (-0.702) 
MarketToBook 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 
 
(0.357) (-0.816) (0.260) (-0.530) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.028 -0.002 -0.077 
 
(-0.073) (-1.365) (-0.266) (-1.208) 
LogRevenue 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.018 
 
(0.214) (-0.934) (0.263) (-0.782) 
InstiOwn 0.002 0.011 0.008 0.052 
 
(0.863) (0.789) (1.208) (1.151) 
Constant 0.002 0.100 0.007 0.298 
 
(0.216) (1.376) (0.307) (1.312) 
   
  
 Observations 615 615 615 615 
R-square 52.5% 58.9% 57.7% 61.7% 
   
  
 Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel C: Following year's innovation 
Panel D: Cumulative three-year 
innovation 
 
Collab Innov Originality Collab Innov[t+1,t+3] Originality[t+1,t+3] 
        
 FoundationGiving 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.099) (-0.502) (0.935) (0.070) 
RD 0.039 0.344** 0.111 0.832* 
 
(1.590) (2.366) (1.360) (1.788) 
Advertising -0.046* -0.090 -0.176* -0.387 
 
(-1.720) (-0.974) (-1.707) (-1.316) 
MarketToBook 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.866) (-0.546) (0.744) (-0.246) 
Leverage 0.001 -0.025 0.003 -0.063 
 
(0.449) (-1.237) (0.303) (-1.000) 
LogRevenue -0.000 -0.008 -0.001 -0.022 
 
(-0.264) (-1.161) (-0.254) (-0.995) 
InstiOwn 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.061 
 
(1.195) (0.942) (1.447) (1.358) 
Constant 0.004 0.113 0.017 0.336 
 
(0.618) (1.572) (0.731) (1.486) 
   
  
 Observations 615 615 615 615 
R-square 45.3% 58.4% 50.1% 60.6% 
   
  
 Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF48 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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